Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty - The Antarctic Treaty - Antarctic Minerals Convention - Wellington Convention - Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities by McColloch, Rodney R.
PROTOCOL ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION TO THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY-THE ANTARCTIC TREATY-
ANTARCTIC MINERALS CONVENTION-WELLINGTON
CONVENTION-CONVENTION ON THE REGULATION OF
ANTARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCE ACTIVITIES
I. FACTS
On October 4, 1991, the United States, along with twenty-four
other nations, signed the Protocol on Environmental Protection to
the Antarctic Treaty.' This international agreement establishes a min-
imum 50-year ban on the exploitation of Antarctica's oil and mineral
resources. 2 Environmental groups and governments have hailed this
agreement, designating Antarctica as a "natural reserve, devoted to
peace and science," 3 as a "victory,"14 and "a giant step toward a
comprehensive approach to environmental protection in Antarctica.'' 5
However, this unprecedented effort by environmental groups through-
out the international community to protect the pristine environment
of Antarctica has resulted in more than just the protection of the
fragile Antarctic ecosystem. This international effort has also resulted
in strategically avoiding potential international discord.
The Southern Ocean surrounding Antarctica has been the scene of
large-scale ocean resource exploitation since the beginning of the mid-
, Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, opened for
signature Oct. 4, 1991, XI ATSCM/2/3/2 (done at Madrid Oct. 3, 1991), reprinted
in 30 I.L.M. 1461 [hereinafter Protocol]. See Alan Riding, Accord Bans Oil Ex-
ploration in the Antarctic for 50 Years, N.Y. TnEs, Oct. 5, 1991, at 1, col. 5.
2 Protocol, supra note 1. The Protocol also creates a Committee on Environ-
mental Protection, as well as five legally binding Annexes governing Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures (Annex I), the conservation of Antarctic fauna
and flora (Annex II), waste disposal and waste management (Annex III), prevention
of marine pollution (Annex IV), and area protection and management (Annex V).
Id. at 1473, 1476, 1479, 1483; Annex to Recommendation XVI-10, Annex V to the
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty: Area Protection and
Management, Antarctic Treaty XVIth Consultative Meeting (Bonn, Oct. 7-18, 1991).
3 Protocol, supra note 1, at 1462.
4 Victory for the Frozen Continent, CALYPso Loo (The Cousteau Society, Los
Angeles, Cal.), Aug. 1991, at 17.
1 A Critique of the Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection,
ASOC Info. Paper No. 1, XVI ATCM/INFO 21 (Oct. 8, 1991).
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19th century. 6 However, not until the early 1970s did there appear
to be a growing interest in the possible exploitation of mineral re-
sources in Antarctica. 7 Following the 1973-74 oil embargo by OPEC
(the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and the resulting
increase in oil prices, the Antarctic Treaty Consultive Parties (ATCPs)8
began receiving inquiries and requests from various industrial concerns
interested in Antarctica's petroleum potential. 9 Fearful that mineral
resource activity might cause serious damage to the Antarctic
ecosystem 0 and that a discovery of substantial mineral wealth in the
Antarctic could lead to an unfreezing of claims on Antarctic terri-
tory," thus destabilizing the entire Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), 12
6 R. Tucker Scully & Lee A. Kimball, Antarctica: Is There Life After Minerals?,
MAnRE POLICY, Apr. 1989, at 87, 88. Early interest was primarily in the exploitation
of marine mammals such as whales and seals, until the emergence of a commercial
interest in fisheries in the late 1960s. Id.
7 See Andrew N. Davis, Note, Protecting Antarctica: Will a Minerals Agreement
Guard the Door or Open the Door to Commercial Exploitation?, 23 GEo. WAsH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 733, 740 (1990).
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 establishes a "2-tier" hierarchy for voting on
Agreed Measures based on each nation's participation in scientific research. The
Cousteau Society/Foundation Cousteau, Antarctica in the 1990's: Challenge for a
True Global Environmental Policy 9 (1990) (Background Paper) [hereinafter An-
tarctica in the 1990s]. Of the current 39 countries who have ratified the Treaty, 25
are recognized as Consultative Parties based on their contribution to scientific
research. Id. The other 14 nations have ratified the Treaty but do not maintain
"substantial" scientific activity in Antarctica. Id. These countries are called Non-
Consultative Parties. Id. For information on the Antarctic Treaty, see infra note
11.
, Davis, supra note 7, at 740. British Petroleum, Gulf Oil Co., Japan National
Oil Corp., and the French Petroleum Institute have all expressed an interest in
searching for Antarctic oil. Waller, infra note 12, at 637 n.44. However, in the
United States, neither petroleum nor hard minerals industries are enthusiastic about
initiating work in Antarctica. Davis, supra note 7, at 764. The existence of minerals
in Antarctica is still considered speculative, and mining activities in the harsh Antarctic
environment would be very expensive compared to other alternatives still accessible
in other regions of the world. Id. Furthermore, since giant icebergs up to three
miles wide and 1,600 feet deep scour the seabed, storage tanks and other onshore
facilities would have to be located on the two percent of the continent not covered
by ice-the same coastal areas that serve as a breeding ground for wildlife. Margot
Hornblower, The Last Untouched Continent, WAsH. POST, Feb. 2, 1981, at Al,
A14, col. 6.
,0 Antarctica in the 1990s, supra note 8, at 17.
" Studies indicate that mineral exploration or exploitation activities could disrupt
the fragile Antarctic ecosystem and threaten the stability of the present political and
legal regime of Antarctica. Waller, infra note 12, at 633. Under the Antarctic Treaty,
Article IV reads:
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force
[Vol. 22:211
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OF ANTARCTIC
the Consultative Parties decided the best means to avoid a rush on
Antarctic mineral resources was to develop a legal framework within
the current ATS that could regulate such activities should mineral
exploration and exploitation become feasible. 3
Negotiations for a possible mineral resource regime began in June
of 1982 in Wellington, New Zealand.' 4 Among the principal concerns
were the protection of the Antarctic's unique environment, the con-
shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying a claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in
Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in
force.
Antarctic Treaty, done at Washington, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S.
71 (entered into force June 23, 1961) [hereinafter Antarctic Treaty].
12 Scully & Kimball, supra note 6, at 88. The Treaty has frozen territorial claims
from certain countries in the interest of allowing scientific research to continue free
from international disputes over territory. Id. Among the Consultative Parties are
the claimant nations of Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, Norway, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom. Antarctica in the 1990s, supra note 8, at 9. Non-claimant
Consultative Parties consist of Japan, Poland, USSR, USA, FGR, Belgium, Brazil,
India, South Africa, China, Uruguay, Italy, GDR, Spain, Sweden, South Korea,
Peru, and Finland. Id.
Non-claimant parties neither claim territory in Antarctica, nor recognize any other
territorial claims. Deborah C. Waller, Abstract, Death of a Treaty: The Decline and
Fall of the Antarctic Minerals Convention, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 631, 638
(1989). The Non-Consultative Parties are Austria, Bulgaria, Cuba, Denmark, Ecu-
ador, Greece, Hungary, Papua New Guinea, Netherlands, North Korea, Rumania,
Czechoslovakia, Canada, and Colombia. Antarctica in the 1990s, supra note 8, at
9.
Three treaties, along with the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, comprise the international
legal regime typically referred to as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS). Davis, supra
note 7, at 737-39. These consist of the 1964 Agreed Measures for the Conservation
of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic
Seals (CCAS), and the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources (CCAMLR). Id. For a Timeline of Antarctic Agreements, see
Antarctic Update, CALYPso LoG (The Cousteau Society, Los Angeles, Cal.), Apr.
1990, at 5.
'3 Waller, supra note 12, at 646. This mining issue is called the "most difficult
challenge the Consultative Parties have ever faced under the Antarctic Treaty Sys-
tem." Id. at 659.
The parties also wanted to quickly generate an internal minerals regime before
the United Nations established a competing regime. Ronald W. Scott, Protecting
United States Interests in Antarctica, 26 SAN DEnGo L. REv. 575, 595 (1989). This
urgency was detected in the United Nations by 1982, thus igniting debate on what
was termed "the Question of Antarctica." Id. at 597. This debate was initiated by
an address by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohamad stating that "An-
tarctica, having no indigenous population, was the res of the entire international
community." Id.
14 Davis, supra note 7, at 740.
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tinued existence of the original Antarctic Treaty, and the protection
of interests embodied in Article IV" of the Antarctic Treaty regarding
territorial claims. 16 On June 2, 1988, after six years and twelve special
consultative meetings,' 7 the Consultative Parties of the Antarctic Treaty
unanimously adopted the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic
Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA). 8
However, CRAMRA would not go unchallenged. As early as 1972
environmental and other special interest groups were taking a serious
interest in Antarctica 19 and by 1988 were convinced that CRAMRA
was not an environmentally sound measure. 20 From 1983 to 1988,
" Antarctic Treaty, supra note 11.
16 Davis, supra note 7, at 741. Three of the seven claimant nations (Chile,
Argentina, and the United Kingdom) claim overlapping territory. Waller, supra note
12, at 638.
17 Davis, supra note 7, at 741.
19 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened
for signature Nov. 25, 1988, AMR/SCM/88/78, (done at Wellington June 2, 1988),
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 868 [hereinafter CRAMRA]. CRAMRA is also referred to
as "The Wellington Convention" and the "Antarctic Minerals Convention." See
also Antarctica in the 1990s, supra note 8, at 17.
The Antarctic Treaty members have established four foundational principles:
1. the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties will control the negotiation and
implementation of a minerals regime;
2. the entire Antarctic Treaty will be preserved, and in particular, the provisions
of article IV pertaining to territorial claims will not be affected by any activities
undertaken in conformance with the regime;
3. protection of the Antarctic environment and ecosystem is a fundamental
consideration of any proposed action under the regime; and
4. the activities of the regime should be acceptable to all states which are not
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. Activities should not otherwise prejudice the
interests of all mankind in Antarctica.
Scott, supra note 13, at 596.
19 Alerting the World to Save Antarctica, CALYPsO LOG (The Cousteau Society,
Los Angeles, Cal.), Feb. 1990, at 6 [hereinafter Alerting the World]. Captain Jacques-
Yves Cousteau compares and remembers his 1972 voyage to Antarctica with his
recent journey in January of 1990 stating:
the landscape is still as wonderful as in 1972, with glaciers and domes of
snow pierced by black peaks, torn by volcanic rocks that are themselves
in shreds. The Three Brothers Mountain still somberly dominates Fildes
Bay. But there the resemblance to my memory ends. I fear that ... the
continent that the Antarctica Treaty tried to preserve, and ... the four
wooden crosses for the British men who died at their work as pioneer
scientists in 1946, will be only a grimacing memory of a sinister drama
that ends in oil spills.
Id.
o Davis, supra note 7, at 734. The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition
(ASOC), joined by Greenpeace believe that commercial exploitation of minerals will
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the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), a group rep-
resenting an international consortium of over 175 environmental and
conservation groups, joined with Greenpeace in engaging in various
types of symbolic demonstrations aimed at derailing CRAMRA al-
together. 21 The mineral resources debate was quickly turning to a
debate regarding the development of a new accord aimed at making
Antarctica an international wilderness reserve. 22
Following an aggressive campaign in Europe by the French Explorer
Jacques-Yves Cousteau23 which focused on the Bahia Paraiso oil spill
damage the relatively pristine Antarctic ecosystem. Id.
In 1982, ASOC established The Antarctic Project (TAP) as a non-profit organ-
ization to serve as the secretariat and funding base for ASOC in the northern
hemisphere. TmE ANTARcTic PROJECT, 1991 REPORT 2 (1991) [hereinafter TAP RE-
PORT].
By June 1988, ASOC members were contacting governments and organizing
symbolic demonstrations in an effort to find at least one government which would
refuse to sign the agreement. Id. at 3.
Kelly Rigg, the Antarctica campaign director of Greenpeace International, called
the treaty a "sellout of the environment to mining interests." Doerner, Antarctica-
How to Open up the Coldest Cache, TIME, June 20, 1988, at 38.
21 TAP REPORT, supra note 20, at 2.
22 Davis, supra note 7, at 734.
Both the ASOC and Greenpeace argue that no international agreement allowing
minerals activities in Antarctica could adequately protect the Antarctic environment.
Waller, supra note 12, at 660.
In early 1990, the Cousteau Society launched an aggressive petition drive to
protect Antarctica in its bimonthly publication, Calypso Log. See Victory for the
Frozen Continent, supra note 4, at 17. Then on May 1, 1990, Captain Cousteau
delivered the keynote address to the Interparliamentary Conference on the Global
Environment in Washington, D.C. Captain Cousteau Continues the Campaign,
Calypso Log (The Cousteau Society, Los Angeles, Cal.), June 1990, at 11. In his
visit with international parliamentarians and key administration officials from the
U.S., Cousteau expressed the Cousteau Society's strong opposition to CRAMRA
because it could open the door to mineral exploitation in the Antarctica, and instead
recommended the declaration of Antarctica as an International Natural Reserve-
Land of Science. Id. The following is illustrative of the environmental concerns if
mineral exploitation were to be unleashed by CRAMRA:
A thin film of soot or ash-common industrial wastes-on the ice could
reduce the reflectivity of the continent, thereby altering the planet's heat
and cold exchange. An increase in temperature due to the greenhouse effect
could lead to increased melting of Antarctica's glaciers with a consequent
rise in sea levels near the world's coastal cities.
See Alerting the World, supra note 19, at 4.
3 Waller, supra note 12, at 665. The Washington Post described Cousteau's
remarkable success as follows:
Who can resist this guy? In France, his Foundation Cousteau gets a
million signatures against the Convention [CRAMRA] and-voila! -suddenly
the government, naturally is no longer for it. He goes down to Australia
1992]
GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L.
near the Antarctic Peninsula and its resulting damage to the envi-
ronment, 24 France and Australia were the first nations to indicate
that they had serious reservations about the Minerals Convention.25
In an effort to placate a growing environmental lobby, France an-
nounced in April of 1989 its withdrawal of support from the Minerals
Convention. 26 A few weeks later, Australian Prime Minister Bob
Hawke announced his country's opposition to the agreement, 27 and
with the support of the Australian Senate declared that his country
would not sign the agreement. 2 This declaration sounded the death
knell for CRAMRA since ratification by all claimant states was
necessary for the Convention to enter into force, and both France
and Australia are claimant states. 29
and talks with the prime minister there, Bob Hawke, and-viola!-Australia
is no longer for it.
Phil McCombs, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1989, at Cl, C15, col. 2.
24 Malcolm W. Browne, France and Australia Kill Pact on Limited Antarctic
Mining and Oil Drilling, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 25, 1989, at A10, col. 4. On January
28, 1989, the Argentine Navy ship Bahia Paraiso went aground resulting in a spill
of more than 250,000 gallons of poisonous diesel fuel. Antarctic Update, CALYPSO
LOG (The Cousteau Society, Los Angeles, Cal.), Apr. 1990, at 5. The effects of an
oil spill in the Antarctic are exacerbated by the severe Antarctic climate because ice
and severe weather conditions can interfere with the traditional clean-up methods
and low temperatures retard the biological decomposition of oil. Barbara E. Heim,
Note, Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral Resources: A Comparison of Inter-
national Law Regarding the Deep Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica, 23 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819, 838 n.149 (1990).
25 TAP REPORT, supra note 20, at 3. See also Australia Rejects Proposed Antarctic
Mining Treaty, The Xinhua General Overseas News Service, May 22, 1989, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
26 Waller, supra note 12, at 662. French Prime Minister Michel Rocard did not
completely abandon the notion of establishing an Antarctic minerals regime. Id.
Instead, he expressed his belief that negotiations should be reopened in hopes of
improving the treaty. Id.
" Id. See also Australian PM Against Antarctic Mining, Xinhua (New China)
News Service, May 4, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
n Waller, supra note 12, at 663. On May 3, 1989, the Australian Senate passed
a motion, in opposition to the agreement. Id. Although Australian Foreign Minister
Gareth Evans and Minister for the Environment Graham Richardson both believed
CRAMRA was the only way to protect the environment, two weeks after the Senate's
motion, Australia declared it would not sign, indicating its support for Greenpeace's
notion of turning Antarctica into a world park. Id.
In a joint statement on August 18, 1989, Australian and French Prime Ministers
declared "Mining in Antarctica is not compatible with protection of the fragile
Antarctic environment." Browne, supra note 24, at A10, col. 1. See also Waller,
supra note 12, at 664.
2 Waller, supra note 12, at 663.
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This announcement by France and Australia, signalling the collapse
of six years of negotiations, received strong criticism by the New
Zealand Deputy Secretary of External Relations and Trade, Chris
Beeby.30 Beeby claimed Australia was seeking an "unachievable
utopia"'" and that mineral and oil exploitation in Antarctica was
inevitable.3 2
Nations not a party to the ATS also took an interest in the minerals
debate, sometimes expressing resentment toward the Antarctic Treaty
System (ATS) for giving the Consultative Party members exclusive
decision making power over all matters concerning scientific research,
environmrental protection, and the possible exploitation of Antarctic
minerals. 3 Likewise developing nations accused the United States,
the Soviet Union, and several other ATS members of practicing "neo-
colonialism" by trying to unilaterally restrict mineral exploitation
throughout the continent.3 4
In an effort to restore order to the ATS, a new proposal was
drafted in November 1990 at the fall meeting of Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Members (ATCMs) in Vifia del Mar, Chile." This new
"Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection"
called for prohibitions on mining activities and the establishment of
Antarctica as a "natural reserve devoted to science.''36 However, the
United States State Department continued to favor an agreement
which would permit environmentally sound mining, something en-
vironmentalists maintain will never be possible due to the fragile
10 Id. Beeby chaired the six-year negotiation of CRAMRA. Id.
31 Id. See also Davis, supra note 7, at 735.
32 Browne, supra note 24, at A10, col. 2. New Zealand and the United States,
among others, also believed exploitation was inevitable. The U.S. State Department
felt it would be better to have regulated exploitation rather than a legal vacuum in
which no restraints of any kind would be imposed, even on the most environmentally
hazardous exploitation. Id.
The United Kingdom and Soviet Union also joined in criticizing the "world park"
notion at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic
Treaty held in Paris in October of 1989. Waller, supra note 12, at 666.
11 Waller, supra note 12, at 660. In a United Nations debate, several developing
nations have expressed their desire for a broader international agreement that would
allow Antarctic activities to be carried out for the benefit of all humanity. Id.
34 Browne, supra note 24, at A10, col. 3. Malaysia has persistently insisted that
any mineral resources found in Antarctica must be shared equally with the rest of
the world. Exploring the Last Frontiers, supra note 24, at 844.
3A A New Phase, CALYPso Loo, (The Cousteau Society, Los Angeles, Cal.), Apr.
1991, at 11.
16 Id. No agreement was reached regarding the duration of. such a moratorium
on mining or under what conditions it should be lifted. Id.
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nature of the Antarctic ecosystem and the reality of human error. 7
In what has been called a "stunning reversal of policy," New
Zealand's Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer announced in late February
of 1990 that the CRAMRA debate was "wasting energies which could
be spent on achieving environmental protection for the Antarctic,"
and that his country would not ratify the Minerals Convention. By
the end of March, the United States was one of only a few remaining
proponents of CRAMRA.3 9
Negotiators from the United States were primarily concerned with
the new Protocol's effect on foreclosing the possibility of mineral
exploration and exploitation forever. This opposition to an outright
permanent ban reflected the realistic acceptance of national energy
appetites in the event of scarce energy resources and indicated the
need for international regulation of mining should such mining be-
come feasible or necessary, thus protecting the Antarctic environment
through regulation. 40 Furthermore, the United States did not feel it
was opening the door to mining due to the strict requirements under
CRAMRA which made it nearly impossible to obtain consent to
proceed with mineral exploitation. 4' Rather, CRAMRA was viewed
as providing a "framework to guide future decisions on whether
Antarctic minerals should be developed, and if so, under what cir-
cumstances. "42 According to this view, there was no presumption
1 Id. Under CRAMRA, operators involved in mineral exploitation whose activities
result in environmental damage have two defenses to strict liability: an exceptional
natural disaster that could not have been reasonably foreseen; or armed conflict or
an act of terrorism against which no reasonable precautionary measures could have
been effective. Scully & Kimball, supra note 6, at 91. See also McCombs, supra
note 23, at C15, col. 2 (Cousteau believes if mining took place in Antarctica,
"fa]ccidents would be inevitable, and the consequences are frightful.")
11 Antarctic Update, CALYPSO LOG, (The Cousteau Society, Los Angeles, Cal.),
Apr. 1990, at 4. Equally surprising was Soviet Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev's
announcement in January of 1990 that "[tihe USSR is ready to participate in the
survival of the Antarctic, of this world reserve, which is our common natural
laboratory." Id.
19 Id. CRAMRA support in the U.S. was dying quickly with a growing number
of legislators supporting bills to protect Antarctica. Id.
40 For more information, see Browne, infra note 50.
41 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, POLAR PROSPECTS: A
MINERALS TREATY FOR ANTARCTICA, OTA-O-428, at 15 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, Sept. 1989) [hereinafter POLAR PROSPECTS]. This sum-
mary of Antarctic policy stresses that CRAMRA is not intended to, and does not,
promote Antarctic minerals development; however, neither does it ban development
altogether. Id. at 5.
42 Id. at 3.
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built into CRAMRA that any exploitation or development would ever
take place.43
On March 25, 1991, sixteen U.S. Senators sent President Bush a
letter encouraging him to instruct U.S. Representatives attending the
April ATCM meeting" to work with other Treaty members to reach
an agreement which would "effectively protect Antarctica's pristine
environment. ' 45 In this letter, the President was reminded of two
measures he signed into law" declaring it to be U.S. policy to "pursue
an indefinite prohibition of commercial minerals development and
related activities in Antarctica." 47
Still, the United States stood isolated internationally in its reluctance
to sign what it considered a de facto permanent ban on mining."
Largely in an effort to overcome U.S. reluctance, members of the
Treaty compromised on a new agreement allowing a nation to with-
draw from the entire Protocol (not just the minerals prohibition)
upon two years notice if the desired amendments or changes were
not ratified at a review conference within three years of their adoption. 49
But, once again, on June 23, 1991 (the treaty's 30th anniversary),
the United States failed to sign the Protocol at a meeting in Madrid
with the thirty-nine nations presently represented in the agreement,
stating that the U.S. was not in a position to accept the proposal,
but would refer it to Washington for review.50
Finally, on July 3, 1991, President Bush announced the United
States would agree to sign the Protocol.-' In a statement made in
43 Id.
- This meeting was held in Madrid, Spain from April 22-30, 1991. A New Phase,
CALYPSo LOG, (The Cousteau Society, Los Angeles, Cal.), Apr. 1991, at 11.
4" Letter from Senator Al Gore, et al., to President George Bush (March 25,
1991) [hereinafter Letter from Gore to President Bush].
46 Antarctic Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-594, 104 STAT. 2975, 2977
(1990); and S.J. Res. 206, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (calling for immediate
negotiations toward an agreement for full protection of Antarctica as a global
ecological commons).
' Letter from Gore to President Bush, supra note 45.
48 See Victory for the Frozen Continent, supra note 4, at 17.
49 Id. Article 25(5)(b) of the Protocol, termed the "walk-out provision," reads:
(b) If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force
within 3 years of the date of its adoption, any Party may at any time
thereafter notify to the Depositary of its withdrawal from this Protocol,
and such withdrawal shall take effect 2 years after receipt of the notification
by the Depositary.
Protocol, supra note 1, at 1470.
"0 Malcolm W. Browne, U.S. Agrees to Back Accord Protecting Antarctic Min-
erals, N.Y. TujEs, July 6, 1991, at 6, col. 1.
51 Id.
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Rapid City, South Dakota, President Bush affirmed that "the pro-
tection of the Antarctic environment is an important international
responsibility. 5 2 After only four negotiation sessions and one year
of debate, the new Protocol was signed on October 4, 1991, 51 effec-
tively changing the course of history from what had started as a
proposal to create a minerals regime to regulate commercial explo-
ration and exploitation of mineral resources in Antarctica, to an
effective ban on minerals activity for a minimum of fifty years.54
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Some scientists believe Antarctica holds one of the most valuable
mineral resource reserves in the world, 55 yet it is arguably owned by
no one. Hence, this status, sometimes referred to as "terra nullius, "56
often places this mineral rich continent in the spotlight of international
interest, and at times, international discord. Members of the Antarctic
Treaty System (ATS), non-members of the ATS, and non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) in the international community all want
to have a voice in the future of Antarctica; however, the present
52 See Victory for the Frozen Continent, supra note 4, at 17.
Riding, supra note 1, at 28, col. 1. The Protocol was signed in Madrid, Spain
by 24 out of the 27 members of the Antarctic Treaty, including the Soviet Union,
China, Germany, Canada, Britain, and France. Id. On February 14, 1992, President
Bush sent the Protocol to the Senate for ratification. Congressional and Presidential
Activity, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 32, at F-4 (Feb. 18 1992).
- Article 7 of the Protocol, Prohibition of Mineral Resource Activities, states
that "any activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research, shall
be prohibited." Protocol, supra note 1, at 1464.
11 Antarctica is believed to have once been part of "Godwanaland," a land mass
separated years ago forming India, Africa, Australia, South America, and Antarctica.
Waller, supra note 12, at 632 n.4. Therefore, scientists believe the same valuable
mineral resources found in these other continents will be found in Antarctica. Id.
U.S. geological surveys indicate as much as 45 billion barrels of oil and 115 trillion
cubic feet of gas could exist off Antarctic's coast, amounting to five times the
amount estimated to be in Alaska's reserves. McCombs, supra note 23, at C15, col.
5; Heim, supra note 24, at 837 n.135. Furthermore, because fresh water is fast
becoming an increasingly valuable resource in arid regions, icebergs, each of which
contain approximately one billion tons of fresh water, have the potential to become
a commercially exploitable resource. Davis, supra note 7, at 747 n.97. For a detailed
look at the potential for mineral resources in Antarctica, see POLAR PROSPECTS,
supra note 41, at 90. The U.S. claims that there are no known mineral deposits of
commercial interest in Antarctica. Id. at 93.
16 "Territory of no one." Scott, supra note 13, at 581; see also Frank C.
Alexander, Jr., Legal Aspects: Exploitation of Antarctica Resources, 33 U. ML.OB
L. Ruv. 371, 387 (1978).
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regime" governing Antarctica appears to be proceeding cautiously in
opening Antarctica up to public scrutiny in the international com-
munity.
As early as 1908, nations began to lay claims over the ice-covered
land of Antarctica.18 By 1942, seven nations had claimed territory in
Antarctica, leaving approximately fifteen percent of the continent
unclaimed still today. 9 Claims by Argentina, Chile, and the United
Kingdom largely overlap and are at times violently disputed. 60 Most
other members of the Antarctic Treaty, such as the United States, 6'
vigorously oppose all claims. 62
There are several theories upon which nations can base territorial
claims to land. Australia, France, and the United Kingdom base their
claims primarily on the discovery theory which follows the assumption
that prior to discovering Antarctica, it was essentially terra nullius.
However, in the 1928 Island of Palmas case,63 discovery alone was
held to be an insufficient basis to support a claim to territorial
sovereignty.6 Discovery can, however, give rise to an exclusive right
to occupy the territory without actual displays of sovereignty, such
as occupation of the territory, if for some reason a territorial claim
cannot be perfected. 65 Therefore, it is apparent that discovery must
be accompanied by some exercise of control or occupation for the
11 The Antarctic Treaty System is composed of all Consultative and Non-con-
sultative members to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.
38 Scott, supra note 13, at 581. The United Kingdom was first to claim sovereignty
over Antarctica in 1908, followed by New Zealand (1923), France (1924), Australia
(1933), Norway (1939), Chile (1940), and Argentina (1940). Id.
59 Id.
6o Id. Several times in recent decades, Chile and Argentina have been on the
brink of war regarding these disputed claims. Browne, supra note 24, at A10, col.
4.
61 The United States have never made a formal claim to territory in Antarctica,
even though it has the most extensive history of activity on the continent of all the
interested and claimant nations. Scott, supra note 13, at 583. However, the United
States and the Soviet Union have effectively neutralized the entire range of preexisting
territorial claims by strategically placing their bases around the Antarctic coastal
circumference and at the point of convergence of all sector and continuity-based
claims. Id. at 602.
62 Id. at 581. No claims are currently recognized under Art. IV of the Treaty.
See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 11.
63 Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
64 Judge Max Huber of Switzerland, the sole arbitrator, also rejected the contiguity
theory as a legitimate basis for a claim to sovereignty. JEFFREY D. MYHR, THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM: POLITICS, LAW, AND DIPLOMACY 8-9 (1986).
65 Id.
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discovery principle to apply, but the amount of control required
remains at issue.
In the Clipperton Island Award case, 66 the requirement of oc-
cupation was relaxed to a certain extent, with the arbitrator holding
that a state could fulfill its requirement for effective occupation
simply by proving a will to act as sovereign when claiming an
unpopulated or largely uninhabitable area. 67 Traditional acts of
sovereignty, such as setting up a police force or a postal service,
were not required.
Likewise, in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, 6 the
Permanent Court of International Justice held that because of the
relatively inaccessible nature of Greenland due to its severe climate,
Denmark's will to act as sovereign over all of Greenland, even
though it did not occupy all the land, was sufficient to establish
sovereignty over the entire territory. 69 Therefore, actual occupation
may not be necessary in Antarctica's case so long as a nation
continuously expresses its will or intent to permanently occupy its
sector, but has found it unrealistic or impossible to do so as a
result of the severe climate.
Sometimes a nation will invoke alternative bases for claims, such
as exploration, 70 continuity 7 contiguity, 72 uti possidetis, 3 propin-
quity, 74 and the sector theory75 to supplement the discovery prin-
66 Clipperton Island Arbitration (Mex. v. Fr.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1105 (1931) (arbitrated
under the auspices of King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy).
67 MYHRE, supra note 64, at 10.
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 53, at 22 (Apr. 5).
MYHRE, supra note 64, at 10.
70 Scott, supra note 13, at 582.
71 Continuity refers to the inward extension of spheres of influence from coastal
settlements. Id. at 582 n.39, citing J. KISH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SPACEs 53,
73-74 (1973).
72 An extension of sovereignty from coastal settlements to islands. Scott, supra
note 13, at 582 n.40. Generally, continuity is not believed to be applicable in
Antarctica due to Antarctica's great distance from any other land mass. Id. See
also WILLIAM E. WESTERMEYER, THE POLITICS OF MnERAL REsoURCE DEVELOPMENT
IN ANTARCTICA 32 and app. C (1984).
11 This is an argument Chile or Argentina might make based on the rights inherited
by South American claimant nations from Spain in 1493. Scott, supra note 13, at
582 n.42.
14 The propinquity theory provides that when a state acquires sovereignty over
part of a geographical unit, it acquires sovereignty over the entire unit. Thus, a
research base could be used to support a claim to an entire geographic unit within
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ciple.76 Chile has even created a settlement of over 100 families on
King George Island" in an attempt to perfect title by effectively
occupying their territory.7 8
Fortunately, negotiators of the Antarctic Treaty were wise enough
to devise a scheme, in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959,
whereby scientific research could proceed unmolested while claims
on territory were in effect stayed, until the Treaty ended or the
Consultative Party members could reach a consensus on how to
deal with the conflicting positions on sovereignty. 79
A. Interests from Outside the Regime
On December 9, 1982, the United Nations began debate on what
is referred to as "the Question of Antarctica." 0 This debate was
prompted by the developing nations' concern that the Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Members (ATCMs) were about to reach agree-
ment on a minerals regime which could effectively prevent the
developing countries of the world from sharing in the wealth re-
sulting from mineral exploitation.8'
At the opening of "the Question of Antarctica" debate, Malay-
sian Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohamad asserted that Antarc-
tica, having no indigenous population, is the res of the entire
which the base is situated. Douglas M. Zang, Note, Frozen in Time: The Antarctic
Mineral Resource Convention, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 722, 743 (1991).
71 Generally, the sector theory holds that states whose territory extends above the
Arctic Circle acquire sovereignty over the triangular sector extending from the
country's northern coastline to the apex at the north pole. Id. This theory was first
applied to the Arctic Ocean in 1907 by Canada and the Soviet Union to justify
claims to lands and islands lying between their northern borders and the North Pole.
Alexander, supra note 56, at 388.
76 Legal Aspects, supra note 56, at 388.
7. Scott, supra note 13, at 604. Chile has even included support facilities such
as schools, telephone, radio, and television service, along with a hotel to accommodate
tourists. Id.
78 The doctrine of effective occupation requires state-sanctioned, permanent oc-
cupation and settlement in order to perfect title. Zang, supra note 74, at 741. The
question remaining is just how much activity is required to establish an effective
occupation. Id. For more information on Chile's claim, see Luis H. MEIco, AN-
TARCTICA: CHImE's CLAmI (1987).
19 Zang, supra note 74, at 729-30. This compromise is embodied in article IV of
the Antarctic Treaty and states that no new claims may be asserted while the Treaty
is in force, and that acts occurring during such time may not constitute a basis for
asserting, supporting, or denying any further claim. Id. at 729. See Antarctic Treaty,
supra note 11.
80 Scott, supra note 13, at 597.
1, Zang, supra note 74, at 760.
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international community, and therefore the riches of Antarctica
should be shared with the rest of the nations of the world.82 This
view, known as the common heritage principle, 3 supports the prop-
osition that Antarctica, like the sea and space, is an area deemed
part of the common heritage of mankind and is not subject to
national jurisdiction; any benefits derived therefrom must inure to
the international community. s4
A number of public interest non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
are also demanding a voice in Antarctic affairs, such as the Antarctic
and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC),s5 Greenpeace, and the Cous-
teau Society. Up until 1983,86 the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) was
virtually closed to public scrutiny; not even the United Nations was
granted observer opportunities. 7 However, NGOs are now playing
an important role in generating public interest in protecting the Ant-
arctic environment and helping to formulate and implement policies
governing Antarctica.
8 1
In an effort to inform the international community of what was
going on in Antarctica, NGOs began serving as "private sector ad-
visors" on national delegations.8 9 In 1982, ASOC established the
Antarctica Project as a non-profit organization to serve as the sec-
82 Scott, supra note 13, at 597.
83 The common heritage principle has five common elements:
1. the area under consideration cannot be subject to appropriation;
2. all countries must share in management of the resources;
3. there must be an active sharing of the benefits derived from the ex-
ploitation of the resources;
4. the area must be dedicated exclusively to peaceful purposes; and
5. the area must be preserved for future generations.
Heim, supra note 24, at 827.
14 Zang, supra note 74, at 765. A group of more than 100 Third World countries,
known as the "Group of 77," has become increasingly aware of the feasibility of
including Antarctica in the area to be regulated by the international authority for
the seabed. Alexander, supra note 56, at 402. This would allow Third World countries
to share in the minerals found in Antarctica. Id.
85 ASOC was formed in 1977-78 and represents over 175 environmental and
conservation groups throughout the world on such issues as ozone depletion, ocean
protection, and the polar regions. TAP REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.
In 1983, the ATS began de-classifying documents, including documents from
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings VIII to XIV. Lee A. Kimball, WORLD RE-
SOURCES INST., Report on Antarctica 10 (Nov. 1989) (photocopy on file with author).
87 For a history of NGO involvement, see Lee Kimball, The Role of Non-
Governmental Organizations in Antarctic Affairs in THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME
33, 34-63 (Christopher C. Joyner & Sudhir K. Chopra eds., 1988).
88 Id.
89 TAP REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.
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retariat and funding base for ASOC in the northern hemisphere.9
A year later, ASOC joined in the United Nations debate over An-
tarctica by providing detailed information to the United Nations in
the form of regular reports and documents written for use by the
U.N. General Assembly.9' Finally, after many published critiques of
the Minerals Convention in 1988 and 1989, a new protocol was signed
which reflects some practical provisions found in ASOC documents.9 2
Even more remarkable, in 1991 ASOC was accredited observer status
at a regular Antarctic Treaty meeting, 93 something unheard of less
than a decade ago.
III. ANALYSIS
The Antarctic Treaty System represents a unique international re-
gime which has experienced great success in maintaining a careful
balance between international interests (such as scientific research and
environmental protection) and national interests (such as unfettered
research, unrecognized territorial claims, and the pursuit of limited
commercial uses by sovereign nations) in Antarctica.9 The negotia-
tions leading to the signing of the new Protocol to the Antarctic
Treaty raised many unprecedented and interesting legal issues that
are likely to arise again in the future as the world continues to
improve its mineral prospecting and exploitation technology. Among
these are: 1) the status of territorial claims in Antarctica; 2) the nature
and validity of the legal rights held by the United Nations and the
international community in Antarctica and its resources; and 3) the
growing role non-governmental or international organizations are
playing in the making of international law and policy.
A. Territorial Claims By Treaty Members
The new Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic
Treaty has once again postponed the question of territorial claims
to Antarctica.9 5 Although commentators argue that a permanent mor-
90 Id. at 2.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 3.
93 Id. at 3-4 (1991 ATCM in Bonn, Germany).
91 137 CONG. REc. E3266-67 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1991) (letter of Rep. William S.
Broomfield in support of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic
Treaty).
" Riding, supra note 1, at 1, col. 5. Under Article 4 of the Protocol, the Antarctic
Treaty is neither modified nor amended, thus preserving the current rights and
obligations of the Parties under the international instruments in force within the
Antarctic Treaty System. Protocol, supra note 1, at 1463.
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atorium is not legally enforceable and ignores the needs of the future,9
studies indicate that mineral exploration or exploitation activities
could cause irreversible environmental damage to the fragile Antarctic
ecosystem, and threaten the stability of the present political and legal
regime now in place.9
With the signing of the new Protocol comes a restoration of the
friendly relations and cooperation which led to the signing of the
Antarctic Treaty in 1959. By agreeing in Article 4 of the Protocol
to preserve the current status of territorial claims, in effect ignoring
the issue again, the ATS was able to compromise and reach an
agreement which will avoid an issue which could create great inter-
national discord between claimant and nonclaimant nations (possibly
resulting in an environmental disaster) and which will also allow
scientific operations to continue into the future, uninterrupted by
debate over territorial claims.
Some commentators even suggest that a de facto condominium
could arise out of this continued co-existence.98 This pooling of
independent claims would not require that existing claims be resolved,
but rather would create a larger and stronger consolidated claim that
would be able to stand up against any outside state or group of
nations.9 This position would be supported by customary interna-
tional law, wherein if nations recognize a general principle or agree-
ment, and act in acquiescence over a period of time as though it is
9 Heim, supra note 24, at 846. The United States Department of State feels that
a ban on mineral activities will be difficult to enforce, and that "it is better to have
regulated exploitation than a legal vacuum in which no restraints of any kind are
imposed on even the most environmentally hazardous exploitation." Waller, supra
note 12, at 666-67.
97Waller, supra note 12, at 633. See also McCombs, supra note 23, at C15, col.
1 ("If claimants and nonclaimants cannot agree . . . the treaty could collapse and,
along with it, a unique experiment in international harmony.")
11 Defined as a territory "under the joint tenancy of two or more States" for
purposes of jurisdiction, a condominium is considered to be a single state. Zang,
supra note 74, at 739 n.136. For a brief summary of some of the theories relied
upon by claimant nations, see generally MExico, supra note 78; and Antarctica After
1991: The Legal and Policy Options, ASOLP Occ. PAPER 2 at 13 (Antarctic &
Southern Oceans L. & Pol'y, Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania, 1989) [here-
inafter Policy Options].
" Zang, supra note 74, at 739. A similar concept would be one in which Antarctica
is held by all the nations of the world, thus internationalizing Antarctica and electing
an international body such as the United Nations to govern the territory. However,
it is unlikely the current Consultative Members would voluntarily relinquish control
so easily.
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legally binding,°° the general principle can become accepted as binding
customary international law. However, this arrangement would ef-
fectively eliminate non-Treaty states from participating in control of
Antarctica. 0'
B. International Recognition Under Customary Law
The present legal regime in Antarctica has had remarkable success
in governing the conduct of Treaty members and maintaining peace
on the disputed continent, giving it the aura of a valid legal system
with recognized authority. Although under international law, treaties
are not binding on nations not a party to the treaty, the existence
of a valid legal regime, such as the Antarctica Treaty System, which
is recognized internationally for its success, creates an enormous
hurdle for any non-Treaty party to overcome if it wants to act contrary
to the rules of "the Club."' 2 For example, during negotiations of
CRAMRA, an Australian Government spokesman warned that
"[alnyone who jumped the gun by attempting to extract minerals or
oil would be subjected to the full weight of international oppro-
brium."'' 0 Furthermore, all major military powers in the world are
members to the Treaty. The United States has even stationed a U.S.
military support force in Antarctica.104
However, this brute force presence does not mean developing coun-
tries are without an argument under customary international law. A
fairly new principle, which has gained recent recognition in the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 05 is the "common
heritage principle" which recognizes that areas deemed part of the
common heritage of mankind are not subject to traditional territorial
l0 Initially, widespread acquiescence to the operation of the Antarctic Treaty
existed. Id. at 748.101 Policy Options, supra note 98, at 15. For a discussion on the general inter-
nationalization model, see FRANcisco 0. VicufiA, ANTARCTIC MINERAL EXPLOrrATION
469 (1988).
-o "The Club" refers to the ATCMs. See also McCombs, supra note 23, at C15,
col. 1 (ATCMs are referred to as the "Antarctic Club").
103 Browne, supra note 24, at A10, col. 4. See also Waller, supra note 12, at 667.
104 Scott, supra note 13, at 605. Even though the Treaty prohibits purely military
operations, the United States has used Antarctica as a training ground while providing
support for the National Science Foundation. Id. at 606.
105 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), U.N. Pub. No. E.83.V.5 (1983),
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention]. The Law of
the Sea Convention declared the deep seabed to be "the common heritage of
mankind," not to be subject to territorial sovereignty. Zang, supra note 74, at 763.
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sovereignty or national jurisdiction, and the benefits derived therefrom
must be shared with the entire international community.' °0 Under this
theory, many developing countries are calling for a broader inter-
national agreement for Antarctica: one that would allow for the
participation of all the nations of the world and guarantee that
activities in Antarctica are carried out for the benefit of all hu-
manity. ,07
Ironically, industrialized nations can rely on the Law of the Sea
Convention as well, not to suggest that the common heritage principle
is a viable theory, but as evidence of its nonviability due to the
failure of the Convention to receive the support of the industrialized
nations.'°0 Whether or not this principle is sound, however, will likely
not affect the current regime that has received new life under the
Protocol. The current ATCMs are experienced experts regarding the
fragile Antarctic ecosystem. Therefore, even if all interested nations
were given a voice in determining policy matters for Antarctica, it
is unlikely they would have sufficient experience in or understanding
of Antarctica to demand acknowledgement by the "Antarctic Club."' '9
Furthermore, with the new Protocol in effect ensuring the survival
of the Antarctic Treaty System for another 50 years, the ATS regime
will likely be able to assert the customary international law argument
that norms first articulated in international agreements (such as the
Antarctic Treaty) can develop into binding customary international
law. 10 Perhaps in retrospect, the nations of the world have already
conformed to the Antarctic Treaty by either signing it or abiding by
its rules;"' therefore, adopting it as a legally valid principle governing
the South Pole." 2 Consequently, any nation caught participating in
,06 Zang, supra note 74, at 765. See also Exploring the Last Frontiers, supra note
24, at 827.
'In Waller, supra note 12, at 660.
101 Zang, supra note 74, at 765.
109 B. Simma, The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty Providing For an "Objective
Regime, " 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189, 191 (1986).
"0 Colin Deihl, Antarctica: An International Laboratory, 18 B.C. ENVTh. AFF.
L. REv. 423, 455 (1991).
'" Francioni, an Italian expert on Antarctica, calls the ATS a "remarkable success
... in preserving the continent from nationalistic aims and unilateral assertion of
claims that evidences the Consultative Parties' sense of obligation and responsibility,
not only inter se, but toward the international community as a whole." F. Francioni,
Legal Aspects of Mineral Exploitation in Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 163,
173 (1986).
112 Deihl, supra note 110, at 456.
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mining activities in violation of the Protocol would be violating
international law." 13
In a broad sense, international law already embodies a number of
specific agreements designed to protect the environment. Even if the
ATS were to be disrupted, customary international law imposes a
duty on each nation to prevent environmental degradation outside
its national boundaries." 4 Since mineral exploitation would be po-
tentially devastating to the fragile Antarctic ecosystem, no mining
activities can take place without violating international law.
Developing countries at the outset of CRAMRA negotiations ex-
pressed an interest in participating in the evolving mining regime. It
now appears the Protocol will not only prevent the depletion of a
valuable energy source before the developing countries have a chance
to share in the exploitation, but also that there is no fear that a
discovery of oil in Antarctica could drive prices down in a market
which is vital to many of these countries. Therefore, due to the
sedative affect the new Protocol has had on the debate over minerals,
"the Question of Antarctica" will likely lose interest, and the ATS
will be able to continue without incident well into the 20th century. ' 5
C. The Environmental Victory
Probably the most obvious and most important result arising from
the signing of the Protocol is the environmental protection guaranteed
Antarctica for the next 50 years, and the solid voice environmental
and conservation groups are gaining in the international law and
negotiations forum. Up until 1983, the Antarctic Treaty System was
basically closed to public scrutiny.1 6 However, with the signing of
the new Protocol comes the ringing in of a new openness in which
the ATS is inviting international organizations to participate in regular
committee meetings 17
113 Id.
114 Deihl, supra note 110, at 455; cf. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/
7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., art. 21(d), U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (1982), reprinted
in 22 I.L.M. 455, 466 (1983) (stating that States and international organizations
should ensure that activities within their control do not damage natural systems
within other states or in areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The United
States was the only nation to vote against the World Charter).
-, Thus making for a strong customary international law argument based on the
proposition that an international agreement may create customary law that binds
third parties, if deemed a general practice and accepted as binding law (opinio juris).
Zang, supra note 74, at 748.
116 TAP REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.
"I ASOC was accredited observer status to attend regular meetings for the first
19921
GA. J. INT'L & CoMip. L.
Recognizing that these organizations can provide valuable advice
and assistance, the Protocol specifically invites organizations to work
with the Committee for Environmental Protection'18 in carrying out
its functions. The purpose of building these relationships between the
ATS and the broader system of non-governmental organizations
throughout the world is to exchange technical information and ex-
pertise, increase communication and coordination in the system, and
to inform the wider international community of Antarctic affairs." 9
However, even though Article 11 of the Protocol invites the views
of NGOs, 20 it still remains limited in that ATCMs must approve
their participation. This in effect could limit participation by NGOs
to those organizations who are more likely to support a policy in
line with the ATCM's agenda. Furthermore, only ATCMs have a
vote, making an NGO's role simply advisory. As one commentator
has noted, "it is strange that a treaty system which seemingly places
such a high emphasis on environmental and scientific values does not
welcome the involvement of people who place a high priority on
precisely those same values."' 2'
Another reality sometimes overlooked when speaking of NGOs is
that such organizations are not immune from political pressures.'2
Problems frequently arise when countries and environmental organ-
izations-such as Greenpeace-debate issues concerning the environ-
ment because oftentimes the environmental interest groups aggressively
pursue their own agenda, demanding absolutes, and showing little
concern for the reality of international politics and the process of
negotiations. 123 Some Consultative Party Members felt this "rail-
time in 1991 and will be represented by skilled public interest lawyers, scientists,
and other NGOs from ASOC member organizations. TAP REPORT, supra note 20,
at 7.
"' Article 11 of the Protocol reads in part:
The Committee may also, with the approval of the Antarctic Treaty Con-
sultative Meeting, invite such other relevant scientific, environmental and
technical organizations which can contribute to its work to participate as
observers at its sessions.
Protocol, supra note 1, at 1465.
19 Kimball, supra note 86, at 9.
'2 See supra note 118.
121 James N. Barnes, Legal Aspects of Environmental Protection in Antarctica in
THE ANTARCTIC LEGAL REGIME 265 (Christopher C. Joyner & Sudhir K. Chopra
eds., 1988).
,22 Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARv. L.
REV. 1484, 1533 (1991)
123 Id.
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roading" of the world park issue took place in the recent negotiations
of the new Protocol because what had been carefully drafted and
negotiated was quickly abandoned overnight by some countries due
to the intense pressure at home from politically powerful environ-
mental organizations.
However, NGOs have also proven to be an asset in reminding
states in the international community of their obligations under in-
ternational law. 24 Likewise, if it were not for the intervention of
NGOs in the ATS, the seventh continent might have become the
subject of violent territorial disputes, possibly leading to irreversible
damage to the world's environment.
This new "openness" in the ATS is good in that developing coun-
tries throughout the international community who are concerned about
the future of Antarctica, but cannot afford financially to undertake
the scientific commitment required to become a Consultative Party
to the regime, will be able to voice their views through organizations
such as ASOC. This participation through observer status can act as
an objective and effective check on the ATS. ASOC and the Cousteau
Society have already displayed their ability to change the course of
events in the recent Protocol negotiations, turning the debate from
mineral resource exploration to comprehensive environmental pro-
tection.
IV. CONCLUSION
The new Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic
Treaty is no less than an extraordinary achievement in international
diplomacy. What was once called an "unachievable utopia" is now
a reality. Through the efforts of environmental organizations world-
wide, the seemingly unresolvable minerals debate has been turned
into an international commitment to protect the Antarctic environ-
ment well into the future. The Antarctic Treaty System has had an
unprecedented history of success in governing a body of land often
called the disputed continent. Perhaps out of the example set by the
Antarctic Regime in negotiating the new Protocol, other international
,ZA For example, NGOs have played important mediatory, humanitarian, and peace-
keeping roles during the Israeli occupation of captured territories. Adam Roberts,
Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967, 84 AM.
J. INT'L L. 44, 101 (1990). The Red Cross has engaged in observing prison conditions,
arranging prisoner transfers, issuing statements regarding international legal provi-
sions, and making private representations to the Israeli government. Id.
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problems can similarly be resolved through compromises between
nations and the acceptance of input by independent organizations
expressing the interests of individuals and developing countries
throughout the international community.
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